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Thinkable: The Charter and Refugee 
Law after Appulonappa and B010 
Colin Grey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Appulonappa1 and its companion case, B010,2 lie at the confluence of 
many debates about global migration and its governance. Both cases 
arose following the arrival in Canada of hundreds of Sri Lankan Tamils 
on two cargo boats, the M.V. Ocean Lady in October 2009 and the M.V. 
Sun Sea in August 2010. These were asylum seekers who came to 
Canada on dangerous vessels because more secure, less costly routes 
were shut to them.3 They were also illegal immigrants whose success 
entering Canada might fuel more migrant smuggling, a transnational 
criminal phenomenon with the potential to undermine national security.4 
Safe to say, the former Conservative government adopted the latter view 
and proceeded accordingly.5 And it was a blow to the government’s 
enforcement-minded response when the Supreme Court unanimously 
                                                                                                                       
  Profésseur régulier, Département des sciences juridiques, UQÀM. I would like to thank 
Audrey Macklin, Gerald Heckman, David Vinokur and an anonymous reviewer for providing 
extraordinarily helpful comments, as well as Louis-Philippe Jannard for research assistance. I am 
grateful to UQÀM’s Programme d’aide financière à la recherche et à la creation and to the 
Foundation for Legal Research for funding a longer-term project on immigration constitutionalism, 
of which this article is a part. Finally, I am grateful to the organizers of Osgoode Hall’s 2015 
Constitutional Cases Conference, where I presented an earlier version of this article. 
1  R. v. Appulonappa, [2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No. 
762 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Appulonappa”]. 
2  B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] S.C.J. No. 58, 2015 SCC 58 
(S.C.C.), revg [2013] F.C.J. No. 322 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “B010”].  
3  For such a view of anti-smuggling measures, see Scott Watson, “The Criminalization of 
Human and Humanitarian Smuggling” (2015) 1:1 Migration, Mobility & Displacement 39. 
4  See Benjamin Perrin, “Migrant Smuggling: Canada’s Response to a Global Criminal 
Enterprise” (2013) 1:2 International Journal of Social Science 139, at 144-45.  
5  For background on the government’s response to the Sun Sea and (despite the title) 
Ocean Lady, see Canadian Council of Refugees, Sun Sea: Five years later (August 2015), online: 
<http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/sun-sea-five-years-later.pdf>; Douglas Quan, “Five years 
after the MV Sun Sea’s arrival, crackdown on ‘irregular arrivals’ draws praise, scorn” National Post 
(August 6, 2015).  
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found that the government could neither prosecute (in Appulonappa) nor 
find inadmissible (in B010) asylum seekers for helping one another enter 
the country illegally, nor could it take such actions against humanitarian 
workers or family members acting from non-financial motives. 
In what follows, I am not concerned with whether these decisions are 
wise or just, nor with whether they properly reflect Canada’s international 
obligations with respect to human rights, refugees and the international 
struggle against migrant smuggling. My concern is instead with their 
impact on immigration constitutionalism in Canada. “Constitutionalism” is 
a high-flown, contested term. Because my main concern is with the cases, 
and not the theory of constitutionalism as such, all I can do here is stipulate 
that by it, I refer to an ideal according to which enforceable norms, such as 
those propounded in the form of immigration law, are subjected to the 
discipline of legal justification, through the medium of various institutional 
forms and practices, including judicial review based on a written bill of 
rights like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 Simplifying 
greatly, I will assume that the ideal of constitutionalism is more robust  
the more it allows for the possibility of further legal justification:7 the  
more responses it yields to each successive “why?”. A more robust 
constitutionalism continues to offer answers to such questions, down to a 
fundamental level. A weaker constitutionalism shuts down such questioning 
with a peremptory “because”. A robust constitutionalism also provides 
greater assurance that exercises of government power, here the power to 
control immigration, are not arbitrary. The more justification is made 
available, the greater authority of the constituted legal system.8  
In the context of immigration constitutionalism, we are distinctively 
concerned with the justification of, hence the authority, of the legal norms 
of immigration governance. I will argue that the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions are disappointing for those who favour a robust immigration 
constitutionalism. To begin, the outcomes in Appulonappa and B010 do 
not rest on any enduring constitutional principles and may be upended — 
                                                                                                                       
6  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7  See Mark Walters, “The Unwritten Constitution as a Legal Concept” in David Dyzenhaus 
& Malcolm Thornburn, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 33, at 49. Note that my claim in this article is that the Supreme Court has, in 
various ways, limited the possibility of robust immigration constitutionalism. I do not ask (1) 
whether it is desirable or required to extend the ideal of constitutionalism to immigration 
governance; (2) whether it is possible to extend constitutionalism to this domain.  
8  For a clear articulation of the relationship between constitutionalism and authority, see 
Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 39-43. 
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indeed, as I will explain in the next section, may already have been 
upended — by legislative changes (Section 2); here the focus is on the 
Court’s instrumentalist methodology for determining the demands of 
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. In the remaining three 
sections, I focus on the issue of when the guarantee of fundamental justice 
found in section 7 is engaged in the immigration context. On this point, 
B010 repeated statements from the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in 
Febles9 in a way that seemed to contradict, without explanation, the 
Supreme Court’s 1985 landmark holding in Singh10 that it would be 
“unthinkable” if section 7 did not provide fundamental justice in the 
adjudication of refugee protection claims (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, I will 
argue that this retreat from Singh has several structural implications that 
dim the prospects for a robust immigration constitutionalism going 
forward (Section 5). 
At the outset, it may help the reader unfamiliar with the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act11 (“the IRPA” or “the Act”) to explain two 
aspects of its design. First, relevant to section 2, the IRPA contains various 
grounds of inadmissibility, part of its overall policy with respect to  
non-citizens’ rights to enter and remain in Canada.12 Less well known, it 
also contains a number of criminal offences intended to support that same 
policy.13 Appulonappa and B010 both address legislative provisions that 
target migrant smuggling. However, the relevant provisions in either case 
target smuggling through the different lenses, respectively, of criminal law 
and immigration law. One way of coming to an understanding of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the two cases is as a response to the question 
of how these different parts of the scheme relate to one another.  
Second, relevant to sections 3 to 5, the IRPA is marked by a series of 
interwoven decision chains, such that different officials at different 
junctures make related, sometimes identical, substantive decisions. Of 
particular importance here, decisions related to refugee protection may be 
made (1) when an officer of Citizenship and Immigration14 (“CIC”) 
                                                                                                                       
9  Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] S.C.J. No. 68, 2014 SCC 68 
(S.C.C.), affg [2012] F.C.J. No. 1609 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Febles”]. 
10  Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.), affd [1986] F.C.J. No. 450 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Singh”]. 
11  S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
12  IRPA, Part 1, Division 4. 
13  IRPA, Part 3. 
14  IRPA, ss. 99 to 101. Note that the “applied title” for the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration is now “Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada” (“IRCC”). Similarly, the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is now referred to as the “Minister of Immigration, 
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decides if a refugee protection claim is eligible to be referred to the 
Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (“IRB”); (2) when either of the RPD or Refugee Appeal Division 
(“RAD”), also part of the IRB, pronounce on a claim;15 (3) when either a 
CIC officer or a delegate of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness decide on a subsequent pre-removal risk assessment 
(“PRRA”), a largely paper-based process available to most non-citizens 
prior to removal;16 (4) when a Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) 
enforcement officer is asked to defer the removal of a non-citizen for 
reasons of risk;17 and (5) on judicial review by the Federal Courts of any of 
these decisions.18 In conception, seemingly, the RPD and the RAD, 
independent tribunals with competence to decide Charter issues and 
greater procedural protections, are the centrepieces of this overall scheme. 
Eligibility determinations serve a gatekeeping function governing access to 
these tribunals. Later PRRA and deferral decisions provide additional 
safeguards to ensure Canada’s compliance with the international law 
principle of non-refoulement, which imposes an obligation not to return 
individuals to countries where they would be at risk of certain kinds of 
serious harm. However, as I will argue, the net effect of B010 and Febles is 
to shift constitutional accountability to these latter stages. 
II. THE CASES: APPULONAPPA AND B010 
1. Appulonappa 
Appulonappa involved a constitutional challenge by the captain and 
three crewmembers of the Ocean Lady to the former section 117 of the 
IRPA. This provision sets out the criminal offence of “organizing entry 
into Canada” — otherwise referred to as migrant, human, or people 
smuggling — under which the four men were charged. Invoking section 7 
                                                                                                                       
Refugees and Citizenship”. However the legal titles remain the “Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration”, as found in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, S.C. 1994, c. 31, and 
the “Minister of Citizenship and Immigration”, as found in the IRPA. In this article, I employ the 
legal titles. I thank David Vinokur for the information used in this footnote. 
15  IRPA, para. 95(1)(b). 
16  IRPA, ss. 112-114.  
17  Authority for this discretion has been located in IRPA, s. 48. See Wang v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 295, [2001] 3 F.C.R. 682 (F.C.T.D.) 
[hereinafter “Wang”].  
18  Access to judicial review is governed by IRPA, ss. 72-74, as well as by the Federal 
Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.  
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of the Charter, the accused argued that section 117 violated the substantive 
principle of fundamental justice that a law must not be overbroad.19 To 
apply the anti-overbreadth principle you ask “whether a law that takes 
away rights in a way that generally supports the object of the law, goes 
too far by denying the rights of some individuals in a way that bears no 
relation to the object”.20 Accordingly, the accused argued that the former 
section 117 went too far by potentially capturing not just those who 
smuggled people into Canada “for a financial or other material benefit”21 
(such as the appellants themselves) but also “people who assist close 
family members to come to Canada and humanitarians who assist those 
fleeing persecution to come to Canada, in each case without required 
documents”.22  
A unanimous Supreme Court accepted this argument. Writing for the 
Court, the Chief Justice reasoned that “the true purpose of s. 117 is to 
combat people smuggling”, and “people smuggling” (as defined in B010, 
more on which below) excludes “mere humanitarian conduct, mutual 
assistance or aid to family members”.23 Given this “true purpose”, the 
provision cast its net too widely. The constitutional infirmity could not be 
saved under section 1 of the Charter,24 so the Chief Justice read down the 
provision to exclude “(1) humanitarian aid to undocumented entrants,  
(2) mutual aid amongst asylum-seekers, and (3) assistance to family entering 
without the required documents”.25 
In evaluating this result, it is worth emphasizing that Appulonappa 
dealt with the former section 117. The easy assumption may be that the 
new section 117 would also be read down to exclude the same three 
categories of persons. But this is not in fact a safe assumption, owing to 
the means-ends analytical approach the Supreme Court has adopted to 
section 7 in recent years.  
                                                                                                                       
19  R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.), affg [1982] B.C.J. 
No. 2596 (B.C.C.A.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, at 
paras. 101-102, 112-119 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]; 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, at paras. 85-88 (S.C.C.), 
revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.); Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law: 2012), at 133-36. 
20  Carter, id., at para. 85. 
21  This phrasing comes from B010, supra, note 2, at paras. 5 and 76. 
22  Appulonappa, supra, note 1, at para. 25. The challenge was raised in a voir dire at trial: 
R. v. Appulonappa, [2013] B.C.J. No. 35, 2013 BCSC 31 (B.C.S.C.), revd [2014] B.C.J. No. 762, 
2014 BCCA 163 (B.C.C.A.).  
23  Id., at paras. 34 and 48. 
24  Id., at paras. 79-82. 
25  Id., at para. 84. For some discussion, see B010, supra, note 2, at para. 60. 
116 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Changes to subsection 117(1) significantly broaden the mental (mens 
rea) and physical (actus reus) elements of the offence.26 In addition, new 
aggravating factors now require more severe penalties if the offence “was 
for profit, or was for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a 
criminal organization or terrorist group”.27 If profit, the involvement of a 
criminal organization, or the involvement of a terrorist group are aggravating 
factors, it seems to follow straightforwardly that an unaggravated offence 
does not require such elements and, more importantly, that it was not meant 
to. Such modifications render more plausible the Crown’s unsuccessful 
argument in Appulonappa that the purpose of section 117 is “to prevent all 
organizing and assisting of unlawful entry of others into Canada, including 
assistance to close family members and humanitarian assistance”.28  
The broader view of the objective of section 117 is also supported by 
other amendments to the IRPA, which create a new statutory context that 
arguably places an even greater premium on the Act’s enforcement and 
control objectives. For example, section 20.1 of the IRPA seems to allow 
the designation of a group of asylum seekers helping one another come to 
Canada “irregularly”, with designation leading to significant consequences, 
such as mandatory detention for all those 16 or older.29 If such a significant 
consequence, among others,30 can be visited upon asylum seekers engaged 
in mutual aid, on what basis can it be said that the new section 117 was not 
intended to have a similar scope? 
All of which is to say that it is unclear whether the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion provides dependable guidance on the constitutionality of the 
new section 117. I am inclined to think that it does not; that Appulonappa  
                                                                                                                       
26  For ease of reference, I reproduce the old and new versions of s. 117 of the IRPA, with 
the changes underlined: 
Former section 117 New section 117 
117 (1) No person shall knowingly 
organize, induce, aid or abet the coming into 
Canada of one or more persons who are not in 
possession of a visa, passport or other document 
required by this Act. 
117 (1) No person shall organize, induce, 
aid or abet the coming into Canada of one or 
more persons knowing that, or being reckless as 
to whether, their coming into Canada is or would 
be in contravention of this Act. 
For discussion of these amendments, see Perrin, “Migrant Smuggling”, supra, note 4, at 144-45. 
27  IRPA, s. 117(3.1)(a)(ii), (3.2)(a)(ii).  
28  Appulonappa, supra, note 1, at para. 13. This was the government’s stated position, 
accepted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal: supra, note 22, at paras. 5, 41. 
29  IRPA, s. 55(3.1). 
30  Other consequences added to the IRPA include longer waits for detention reviews (IRPA, 
s. 57.1) and a less favourable refugee determination process, through the denial of a right of appeal 
to the RAD (IRPA, s. 110(2)(a)), as well as the denial of an automatic stay of removal pending 
judicial review (Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s. 231). 
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is a case, like the Supreme Court’s decision in Agraira, where legislative 
changes render the Supreme Court’s decision dead letter.31 The new  
section 117 seems to have a new end, and a new end makes all the 
difference in the means-end analysis. As I will now explain, this conclusion 
also has implications for our understanding of B010. 
2.  B010 
Appulonappa involved the crew of the Ocean Lady. B010 involved Sun 
Sea passengers who had taken on positions of varying responsibility after 
the ship’s original crew had abandoned it. These were “asylum seekers” 
engaged in “mutual aid”: B010 worked in the engine room; the co-appellant 
B306 was a cook and lookout; another co-appellant, J.P., acted as assistant 
navigator. A fourth, non-Sun Sea appellant, Jesus Rodríguez Hernandez, is 
a Cuban national convicted about a decade ago of smuggling 48 Cubans 
into the United States. The Immigration Division (“ID”) of the IRB found 
all four men inadmissible under paragraph 37(1)(b) of the IRPA, that is, 
“on grounds of organized criminality for … engaging, in the context of 
transnational crime, in activities such as people smuggling”.32 One result 
of this finding is that none were eligible to have their refugee protection 
claims referred to the RPD.33  
The determinative issue in B010 was one of statutory interpretation. The 
Chief Justice, again writing for the full Court, found that the words 
“organized criminality” and “people smuggling” in “the context of 
transnational crime” did not per se exclude the possibility of smuggling 
other than for pecuniary motives.34 However, taking into account the 
                                                                                                                       
31  Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J. No. 36, 
2013 SCC 36 (S.C.C.), affg [2011] F.C.J. No. 407 (F.C.A.). In Agraira, the Supreme Court found 
that the words “national interest” that governed the Minister of Public Safety’s power to grant 
discretionary relief from inadmissibility on security grounds, under the former s. 34(2) of the IRPA, 
was not limited to taking into account national security and public safety. Rather, the discretionary 
power encompassed broader considerations such as the values underlying the Charter and Canada’s 
democratic character: id. at paras. 65, 78. Agraira was released by the Court on June 20, 2013. On 
June 19, 2013, however, the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, S.C. 2013, c. 16 had received 
royal assent. Among other changes, this legislation limited the Minister’s discretionary relief powers 
to exclude considerations beyond national security and public safety: “the Minister may only take 
into account national security and public safety considerations, but, in his or her analysis, is not 
limited to considering the danger that the foreign national presents to the public or the security of 
Canada.” (See id., at s. 18; now IRPA, s. 42.1(3)). In other words, the amendment reinstated the very 
interpretation of the Minister’s discretionary power that had been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
32  IRPA, s. 37(1)(b). 
33  IRPA, s. 101(1)(f).  
34  B010, supra, note 2, at paras. 33-35. 
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broader statutory context, the Parliamentary record, and Canada’s 
international legal obligations,35 she ultimately concluded that not-for-profit 
smuggling was not captured.36 “The tools of statutory interpretation”, she 
wrote, “all point inexorably to the conclusion that s. 37(1)(b) applies only to 
people who act to further illegal entry of asylum-seekers in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit in the context of 
organized transnational crime.”37 Accordingly, the four cases were remitted 
to the ID for redetermination.38  
The Charter entered into the Chief Justice’s analysis in two places, 
both times briefly but importantly. First, the Court dismissed the respondent 
Ministers’ argument that paragraph 37(1)(b) should be read broadly to 
include smuggling other than for profit in order to mirror the offence 
contained in section 117 of the IRPA. This is significant because the 
arguments in the four cases consolidated at the Supreme Court had all, in 
the lower courts, focused on whether paragraph 37(1)(b) should be 
interpreted in light of section 117.39 However, referring to her conclusion 
in Appulonappa, the Chief Justice dismissed this issue summarily on the 
ground that “[a] provision that is unconstitutionally overbroad cannot be 
used to widen a narrower provision.”40 
But: If the amendments to section 117 have made it such that it no longer 
needs to be read down to be Charter-compliant, constitutional considerations 
likely no longer block recourse to section 117 in the interpretation of 
paragraph 37(1)(b). Going forward, the potential broadening of the purpose 
                                                                                                                       
35  That is, Canada’s obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 art. 33 (entered into force April 22, 1954); its Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S .267, art. 1(2), Can. T.S. 1969 No. 29 
(entered into force October 4, 1967) [together, “the Refugee Convention”], as well as the Protocol 
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507 
(entered into force January 28, 2004). 
36  B010, supra, note 2, at para. 72. 
37  Id., at para. 76.  
38  Id., at para. 77. Mr. Hernandez had also been found inadmissible for serious criminality 
under IRPA, s. 36(1)(b).  
39  Thus the certified questions that allowed the appeals to proceed to the Federal Court of 
Appeal asked whether it was appropriate to resort to s. 117 in interpreting s. 37(1)(b) of the IRPA: 
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. P. (J.), [2013] F.C.J. No. 1236, 
2013 FCA 262, at para. 40 (F.C.A.), revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “J.P.”]; B010 v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2013] F.C.J. No. 322, 2013 FCA 87, at para. 4 (F.C.A.), 
revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 58 (S.C.C.). (Under the IRPA, to appeal a decision of the Federal Court to the 
Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court must certify a question of general importance: IRPA,  
s. 74(d).) 
40  B010, supra, note 2, at 40. 
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of the new section 117 may broaden the interpretation of paragraph 37(1)(b) 
as well.  
I do not want to overstate this claim. The Chief Justice, as I have noted, 
gave several reasons in support of her conclusion with respect to the scope 
of paragraph 37(1)(b). If the new section 117 is now Charter-compliant, 
the question becomes whether this fact overcomes the various 
considerations pulling in the other direction. In other words, it is simply no 
longer “inexorably” clear that the Chief Justice’s interpretation remains 
valid. This uncertainty, once again, arises from a section 7 methodology 
that does not look behind Parliamentary intent. This methodology leads to 
a weaker constitutionalism because, effectively, the justification of a 
statute stops with the characterization of its legislative intent.41 That is 
where a last “why” encounters the Court’s final “because”.  
There is a response to this claim of weakness. It is that further 
justification is available; only its institutional locus shifts to the political 
deliberation that takes place within Parliament and in the wider public 
sphere. In the domestic realm where democratic legitimacy is secured by 
the participation and representation of citizens, this is a strong though 
perhaps not decisive reply. As non-citizens, however, migrants are 
formally excluded from domestic processes of democratic deliberation. 
Therefore democratic justification can less plausibly be defended as a 
form of constitutionalism when it comes to immigration governance.  
In this domain, it instead looks like the imposition by fiat of one group’s 
political decisions on outsiders. Hence, a robust constitutionalism in the 
domain of immigration governance would have to defend the soundness 
of Parliament’s choices and to be prepared to pass judgment on those 
choices; in this case, for instance by stating that fundamental justice 
disallows the prosecution of asylum seekers who help one another enter a 
country illegally. That this was not done leaves the door open to the 
kinds of prosecutions and findings of inadmissibility that the Court 
sought to rule out. 
                                                                                                                       
41  Others have criticized this methodology on the basis that the courts are not adequately 
constrained in their characterization of statutory intent. This lack of constraint allows them to 
indulge in “‘result-driven’ reasoning to achieve a desired outcome”: Hart Schwartz, “Circularity, 
Tautology, and Gamesmanship: ‘Purpose’ based Proportionality-Correspondence Analysis in 
Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter” (2015) 35 N.J.C.L. 105, at 108. My argument is that the 
amendments to s. 117 also suggest the contrary weakness. By demurring on any constitutional 
inquiry into a statute’s ends, the means-ends analysis makes the constitutional outcome overly 
contingent on Parliament’s intent. 
120 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
III. B010, FEBLES AND FOUR READINGS OF SINGH 
Thus the first mention of the Charter in B010 was to the now possibly 
irrelevant conclusion in Appulonappa. The second place the Charter 
surfaced was when the Chief Justice addressed an alternative argument 
that the inadmissibility ground in paragraph 37(1)(b) of the IRPA is 
constitutionally overbroad, as was argued with respect to section 117 in 
Appulonappa. The Chief Justice found it unnecessary to address this 
argument in light of her conclusion on the statutory interpretation issue. 
However, she added in obiter that section 7 cannot be used to interpret 
paragraph 37(1)(b) of the IRPA. This is because the determination of 
inadmissibility, even though it may lead to ineligibility to have one’s 
refugee protection claim heard by RPD, did not engage section 7.  
As authority for this statement, she relied on a holding made a year 
earlier from her majority opinion in Febles.42 Febles was a judicial review 
of an RPD decision involving the interpretation of article 1F(b) of the 
Refugee Convention, a clause that excludes from protection persons who 
prior to arrival have committed a “serious non-political crime”.43 The 
Chief Justice found that article 1F(b) was not limited to fugitives from 
justice. In addition, factors such as “post-crime events, like rehabilitation 
or expiation” or current dangerousness could not figure in the evaluation of 
a crime’s seriousness. Rather, the “seriousness” of a crime was fixed at the 
time of its commission.44  
As in B010, in Febles the Charter was only raised as a supporting 
argument. In her opinion,45 the Chief Justice addressed that argument  
by holding that section 7 of the Charter has “no role to play” in interpreting 
the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clauses, as those clauses belong to an 
international instrument.46 Further, the Charter had no interpretative 
purchase with respect to section 98 of the IRPA, the provision incorporating 
                                                                                                                       
42  Supra, note 9. 
43  “The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom 
there are serious reasons for considering that: … (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime 
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee …” See art. 1F(b) of 
the Refugee Convention, supra, note 35. 
44  Febles, supra, note 9, at paras. 3 and 60. 
45  The Chief Justice wrote for five judges of a seven-member panel. Justice Abella, joined 
by Cromwell J, wrote a vigorous dissent but did not comment on the Charter issue: Febles, supra, 
note 9. 
46  Id., at para. 64. 
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the exclusion clauses into the Act, because it lacks ambiguity.47 Finally — 
and these are the important passages for the discussion that follows — the 
Chief Justice said that section 98 would in any event be consistent with the 
Charter because of the availability of a stay of removal through the PRRA 
process:  
… On such an application, the Minister would be required to balance 
the risks faced by the appellant if removed against the danger the 
appellant would present to the Canadian public if not removed … . 
Section 7 of the Charter may also prevent the Minister from issuing a 
removal order to a country where Charter-protected rights may be in 
jeopardy: Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 58.48 
She went on:  
While the appellant would prefer to be granted refugee protection than 
have to apply for a stay of removal, the Charter does not give a positive 
right to refugee protection.49  
Although in Febles the Chief Justice did not say how the availability 
of a PRRA answered the Charter argument, in B010 she clarified that it 
was because section 7 was not engaged prior to that stage:  
… This Court recently held in Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2014 SCC 68, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 431, that a determination 
of exclusion from refugee protection under the IRPA did not engage s. 
7, because “even if excluded from refugee protection, the appellant is 
able to apply for a stay of removal to a place if he would face death, 
torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if removed to that 
place” (para. 67). It is at this subsequent pre-removal risk assessment 
stage of the IRPA’s refugee protection process that s. 7 is typically 
engaged. The rationale from Febles, which concerned determinations 
of “exclusion” from refugee status, applies equally to determinations of 
‘inadmissibility’ to refugee status under the IRPA.50  
That is, if section 7 is not engaged before the RPD, it follows that it is 
not engaged by a decision regarding inadmissibility that would render 
someone ineligible to go before the RPD. The answer to constitutional 
concerns in both cases is the eventual access to a PRRA. 
                                                                                                                       
47  Section 98 of the IRPA states that: “A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of 
the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.” Articles 1E 
and 1F of the Convention are set out in a Schedule to the IRPA.  
48  Febles, supra, note 9, at para. 67. 
49  Id., at para. 68.  
50  B010, supra, note 2, at para. 75. 
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Read together, these passages may surprise those who believe that the 
Singh decision from 1985 stands for the proposition that section 7 is 
engaged by the determination of refugee protection claims51 and that 
fundamental justice requires disclosure of the case to meet and oral 
hearings to deal with credibility issues.52 After all, in Singh Wilson J., 
writing for three judges of a six-member panel, was “prepared to accept” 
that section 7 applied to every person physically present in Canada53 and 
that it was engaged in the case of refugee protection claimants because 
the right to security of the person encompasses “freedom from the threat 
of physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such 
punishment itself”.54 She added: 
… [I]f the appellants had been found to be Convention refugees … they 
would have been entitled as a matter of law to the incidents of that 
status provided for in the Act. Given the potential consequences for the 
appellants of a denial of [Convention refugee] status if they are in fact 
persons with a “well-founded fear of persecution”, it seems to me 
                                                                                                                       
51  See Pearl Eliadis, “The Swing from Singh: The Narrowing Application of the Charter in 
Immigration Law” (1995) 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130, at 130-31 (“The first important principle emerging 
from Singh is that persons physically present in Canada are entitled to have their claims adjudicated 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”); James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander 
Neve, “Fundamental Justice and the Deflection of Refugees from Canada” (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 213-270, at para. 16 (“The Supreme Court of Canada determined in Singh v. Canada 
(Employment and Immigration) that the Charter requires that refugee claimants physically present in 
Canada be given an adequate opportunity to state their case, normally in the form of an oral 
hearing.”); Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto, Irwin Law Inc., 2007), at 38 (“The 
most well-known case involving section 7 is Singh v. Canada, which established a right to an oral 
hearing for refugee claimants in Canada.”); Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee 
Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38 Queen’s L.J. 1, at n. 5 (“As a matter of 
constitutional law, refugee claimants are entitled to a hearing whenever credibility is at stake.”); 
Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty 
Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill L.J. 663, at para. 10 (Justice 
Wilson “concluded that the rights and interests at stake in refugee determination were sufficiently 
serious that deprivation of those rights ‘must amount to deprivation of security of the person within 
the meaning of s. 7.’ She further stated that, as a principle of fundamental justice, serious issues of 
credibility must be determined on the basis of an oral hearing.”) I note that Hathaway and Neve, as 
well as Jones and Baglay, go on to discuss the ways in which sub-Supreme Federal Court 
jurisprudence drifted from this understanding of Singh, a drift I discuss in Section 4, below. 
52  Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 59 (oral hearings) and para. 62 (discovery). 
53  Id., at para. 35. This was the only holding from Singh cited by the Chief Justice in any of 
Febles, B010, or Appulonappa, having been noted in Appulonappa, supra, note 1, at para. 23. Justice 
Wilson wrote for herself, Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. (as he then was). There is a long tradition of 
ignoring the equally authoritative concurring decision of the other three justices, which reached 
largely the same result relying on the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. In the case of this 
article, I continue in this tradition because of my focus on the Charter. 
54  Id., at para. 47. 
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unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to 
fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.55  
When studying this passage, a reader should keep in mind here that 
refugee “status” refers to the assemblage of rights and obligations 
incident to being found to be a refugee. Beyond the right against removal 
to a place where a person would be at risk (as noted, this is the principle 
of non-refoulement),56 status includes also a host of other rights meant to 
ensure that refugees, stripped of the protection of their state of origin, 
may continue to lead meaningful lives, including in Canada a path to 
permanent residence and eventually citizenship.57  
Under the IRPA, this assemblage of rights comes with “protected 
person” status that is conferred when one is granted “refugee protection” 
by the RPD or RAD. Protected person status can also be conferred through 
a PRRA application, but — importantly — not for persons who have been 
found inadmissible on criminality- or security-related grounds (as in B010) 
or excluded from refugee protection under article 1F (as in Febles); in such 
cases, a finding of risk only leads to a stay of removal.58 Thus the Chief 
Justice’s pronouncements in Febles and B010 suggest that claims for 
refugee status do not engage section 7 of the Charter. On its face, this 
conclusion seems to directly contradict Singh. What seemed unthinkable to 
Wilson J. seems to have become thinkable.  
Whether this is actually the case — whether there is an actual 
contradiction — depends on what Singh says. Here matters are not as 
clear as they might be.  
As the first decision applying the Charter to immigration matters, 
Singh was being written against a history of Canadian Bill of Rights59 
case law in which the courts had routinely relied on the fact that 
“immigration is a privilege and not a right”60 to dismiss rights claims by 
non-citizens. This Bill of Rights case law reflected long-standing Anglo-
American doctrine that accorded broad, perhaps unlimited, discretion in 
the setting and execution of their immigration policy. In other words, 
Wilson J. was starting from the base line that “[a]t common law no alien 
                                                                                                                       
55  Id., at para. 52.  
56  Refugee Convention, supra, note 35, at art. 33; IRPA, s. 115. 
57  The Refugee Convention does not strictly enjoin signatory states to offer naturalization to 
refugees: Refugee Convention, supra, note 35, at art. 34.  
58  IRPA, s. 95(1)(b), (c), (2).  
59  Supra, note 53. 
60  Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 49, citing Walter Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of 
Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), at 273.  
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has any right to enter this country except by leave of the Crown; and the 
Crown can refuse leave without giving any reason. … He has no right 
whatever to remain here.”61 At its strongest, this doctrine amounts to 
denying the imperative of justifying immigration decisions to migrants 
beyond ascertaining that a given decision conforms with statute and 
policy. Put otherwise, the traditional doctrine may rest on the proposition 
that immigration law and policy lie beyond the reach of anything but a 
weak rule-of-law (or rule-by-law) constitutionalism, under which the 
inquiry ends once it is ascertained that an official action conforms to the 
statute or lies within the range of a statutorily authorized discretion.62  
It stamps immigration governance as a reserved domain for arbitrariness. 
Against this, Singh held out the promise of bringing immigration 
governance within the embrace of a robust constitutionalism.63 In theory 
if not in practice (no such argument appears to have been made), Singh 
even held the potential to lead to the recognition of a Charter right to 
asylum. This would be the “positive right to refugee protection” 
expressly rejected by the Court in Febles.64 But, as I will now argue, in a 
way that is deeply ironic, Singh’s promise of a more robust immigration 
constitutionalism is undermined by gaps in Wilson J.’s own analysis.  
Justice Wilson’s attempt to chart a path between the radical possibility 
of a right to refugee protection and the traditional common law doctrine 
led to cross-cutting ambiguities in her reasoning that yield several 
readings of Singh. Two ambiguities in particular come out in trying to 
answer the question of whether there is a conflict between Singh, on the 
one hand, and Febles and B010, on the other. The first has to do with 
whether section 7 is engaged because (a1) a statutory right to such 
protection was provided under the Immigration Act, such that if no such 
                                                                                                                       
61  R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] 2 All E.R. 741, at 747 (C.A.), per Lord 
Denning M.R. This passage was cited as authority in Prata v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and 
Immigration), [1976] S.C.J. No. 38, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376, at 380 (S.C.C.), affg [1972] F.C.J. No. 129 
(F.C.A.) and then again in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 27, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at para. 24 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] F.C.J. No. 157 (F.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Chiarelli”]. A classic statement is found in Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain, 
[1904-07] All E.R. Rep. 582, [1906] A.C. 542 (P.C.). 
62  David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 6-7, also 146-47.  
63  Pearl Eliadis and Audrey Macklin both note that in the cases that followed Singh, most 
notably Chiarelli, the Court has failed to subject the common law doctrine to Charter scrutiny: 
Eliadis, “The Swing from Singh”, supra, note 51, at 139ff.; Audrey Macklin, “The Common Law, 
the Constitution, and the Alien” (manuscript on file with author). 
64  Supra, note 9. This is not such an outlandish suggestion, since such a right existed in 
West Germany at the time: see Kay Hailbronner, “Fifty Years of the Basic Law — Migration, 
Citizenship, and Asylum” (2000) 53 S.M.U.L.R. 519. 
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statutory rights were granted, section 7 would not have been engaged; or 
because (a2) of the interest in receiving protection, irrespective of the 
rights accorded in the statute. The first of these possibilities (a1) rests on 
the fact that throughout her decision, Wilson J. is at pains to point out 
that Parliament itself saw fit to accord refugees several rights in the 
Immigration Act, 1976.65 The second (a2) rests on Wilson J.’s emphasis 
on consequences in the passage quoted above. More importantly, it rests 
on her rejection in another part of her decision of the distinction between 
rights and privileges.66 As noted, prior to the Charter this distinction had 
been relied on to support analyses according to which a non-citizen could 
assert no rights beyond those expressly provided by statute. That is, 
because entry and sojourn were historically considered “privileges” at 
common law, no extra-statutory rights protected non-citizens’ interests.67 
It follows that, although Wilson J. expressly stated that she did not have 
“to engage in a larger inquiry into the substantive rights conferred in the 
Act”,68 her rejection of the rights-privilege dichotomy implies the 
availability of such an inquiry. 
The second ambiguity is between whether section 7 was said to be 
engaged in Singh by (b1) the possibility of removal to a country where 
the claimant would face “a threat of physical punishment or suffering”;69 
or by (b2) the possibility of the denial of refugee status (now the status of 
“protected person” conferred upon being granted “refugee protection”) to 
a claimant. Here the first possibility (b1) rests on the manner in which 
Wilson J. emphasizes the consequences of removal, as the key impact of 
                                                                                                                       
65  For instance, when she writes: “It seems to me that in attempting to decide whether the 
appellants have been deprived of the right to life, liberty and security of the person within the 
meaning of s. 7 of the Charter, we must begin by determining what rights the appellants have under 
the Immigration Act, 1976.” See Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 41. Other key passages are found id., 
at para. 52 (“if the appellants had been found to be Convention refugees as defined in s. 2(1) of the 
Immigration Act, 1976 they would have been entitled as a matter of law to the incidents of that status 
provided for in the Act”; this passage in fact immediately precedes the “unthinkable” passage quoted 
above in the main text); id. at para. 55 (“On these appeals this Court is being asked by the appellants 
to accept that the substantive rights of Convention refugees have been determined by the Immigration 
Act, 1976 itself and the Court need concern itself only with the question whether the procedural 
scheme set up by the Act for the determination of that status is consistent with the requirements of 
fundamental justice articulated in s. 7 of the Charter.”); and sundry less significant references to the 
rights in the former Immigration Act, 1976. 
66  Id., at para. 50. 
67  The classic discussion of the rights-privileges distinction is found in William W. van 
Alstyne, “The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law” (1968) 81 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1439. 
68  Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 55. 
69  Id., at para. 47.  
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the rejection of status. I believe it also relies, implicitly, on what many 
would consider the implausibility of the suggestion that a non-citizen 
might have a Charter-protected right to seek a status implying eventual 
access to citizenship. The second possibility (b2) rests on Wilson J.’s 
repeated reliance on the one hand on the entirety of rights accorded to 
refugees under the Immigration Act, 1976 at the time;70 her reference in 
the key passage quoted above to refugee status, in addition to the 
consequences of removal itself; and the fact that a decision to deny 
refugee status was not then, as it is not now, the final decision that would 
have to be made prior to removal, so that the issue at stake before Wilson J. 
really was status and not removal.71 
At the risk of being artificially schematic, these two dimensions of 
ambiguity yield the following table, illustrating four possible readings of 
how Wilson J. found section 7 to be engaged by refugee claims: 
Table 1: Four Readings of Singh 
Section 7 is engaged 
by … 
… the risk upon 
removal (b1) 
… the chance of not 
receiving refugee 
status (b2) 
… the statutory rights 
conferred under the 
Act (a1) 
… the possible denial 
of the statutory right 
not to be removed. 
(a1, b1) 
… the possible denial 
of the statutory right 
to refugee status. 
(a1, b2) 
… the interests at stake 
(a2) 
… the (negative) 
interest against being 
removed to a risk 
situation.  
(a2, b1) 
… the (affirmative) 
interest in receiving 
refugee status.  
(a2, b2) 
 
                                                                                                                       
70  Id., at paras. 14 and 55. Hathaway and Neve emphasize this aspect of the decision, supra, 
note 51, at para. 33. 
71  At the time, a claim for refugee protection interrupted proceedings with respect to 
removal. Once a non-citizen made a claim for refugee protection during an immigration inquiry into 
his or her inadmissibility, the inquiry was adjourned for the determination of the claim. It was only if 
a claim was denied that the inquiry resumed and the subsequent decision regarding inadmissibility 
would be made. See Singh, supra, note 10, at para. 14. I thank David Vinokur for helpful discussion 
of the scheme at the time. 
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In this table, the lower right-hand cell (a2, b2) would represent the 
greatest limitation on Canada’s power to control immigration, and also the 
most robust form of immigration constitutionalism. If section 7 was 
engaged by the interest in receiving refugee status, then any limitation on 
the right to claim refugee status at any time and to have one’s claim heard 
by a tribunal might engage section 7 and hence require a showing of 
conformity with fundamental justice.72 What is more, the lower right-hand 
cell is not obviously confinable to refugee claims alone. First, many non-
citizens fighting inadmissibility and removal either claim to be refugees or 
have been found to be them. Second, even if that were not the case, a focus 
on status, and the range of interests associated with it, may suggest that 
significant interests short of the threat of persecution may engage section 
7. So we can see how the most robust reading of Singh potentially points to 
a world in which most deportation decisions would have to be defended by 
a showing that they were fundamentally just. 
Febles and B010 contradict the two readings found in the right-hand 
column of Table 1 ((a1, b2) and (a2, b2)); they therefore reject the radical 
possibility that section 7 is engaged by the potential deprivation of 
refugee status. However skeptical one might be of this possibility, it does 
not need to be said that, from the point of view of constitutionalism, a 
constitutional outcome ideally should be explained. The Chief Justice’s 
statement that “[w]hile the appellant would prefer to be granted refugee 
protection than have to apply for a stay of removal, the Charter does not 
give a positive right to refugee protection”73 is not so much an 
explanation as an instance of brazen question-begging. 
Further, Febles and B010 could rest either on statutory rights to 
protection against removal or on the interest in not being removed to a 
situation of risk. That is, they themselves are ambiguous as between the 
top and bottom cells of the left-hand column of Table 1 (as between (a1, 
b1) and (a2, b1)). Here it should be recalled that in Febles, the Chief 
Justice only said that section 7 “may … prevent the Minister from 
issuing a removal order to a country where Charter-protected rights may 
be in jeopardy”.74 For reasons I will now explain, however, it seems 
                                                                                                                       
72  Arguments along these lines were in fact attempted and rejected shortly after Singh. See, 
e.g., Bendahmane v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] F.C.J. No. 31, 8 
F.T.R. 241 (F.C.T.D.), revd on other grounds [1989] F.C.J. No. 304, [1989] 3 F.C. 16 (F.C.A.); but 
see Tonato v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] F.C.J. No. 92, [1985] 1 
F.C. 925 (F.C.T.D.). 
73  Febles, supra, note 9, at para. 68. 
74  Supra, note 48 (emphasis added). 
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unlikely that this statement was meant to imply that section 7 protection 
against removal to risk is contingent on a statutory right.  
IV. TOWARD A WEAK READING OF SINGH 
I offer this explanation in the course of a truncated account of how we 
got from Singh to Febles and B010. This is a complex story to which I 
cannot do justice here, but which I will describe as the product of three 
developments.  
The first development is the introduction in 1989, as part of a delayed 
statutory response to Singh, of ineligibility provisions that aimed, initially, 
at preventing repeat claims being made within a short time frame, claims 
by persons who had been granted refugee protection in other countries, and 
other provisions aimed at the perceived mischief of so-called “asylum 
shopping”; amendments that came into force in 1992 added ineligibility if 
a claimant had transited through a “safe third country” and, crucially, for 
past criminal offences.75 (Note that, before February 1993, there was no 
subsequent review for risk corresponding to today’s PRRA;76 further, 
before 1995, it had not been found that enforcement officers had discretion 
to defer removal.77)  
If Singh stands for the proposition that the denial of refugee status or 
the potential consequences of removal to a risk situation, in the absence 
of corresponding statutory rights, engages section 7, then it seems clear 
that ineligibility provisions would do so as well. However, while some 
cases seemed to go the other way,78 it was established in short order that 
                                                                                                                       
75  For an argument that ineligibility grounds of this kind are unconstitutional, see Mark 
Anthony Drumbl, “Canada’s New Immigration Act: An Affront to the Charter and Canada’s 
Collective Conscience?” (1994) 24 R.D.U.S. 385. 
76  The Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, as amended by SOR/93-44 established 
the Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class — precursor to the PRRA — effective 
February 1, 1993: Bochnakov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. 
No. 271, 91 F.T.R. 93, at para. 2 (F.C.T.D.). 
77  Poyanipur v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1785, 
116 F.T.R. 4 (F.C.T.D.); see also Wang, supra, note 17. 
78  See Noor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] Q.J. No. 722, at 
para. 67 (Que. S.C.), revd [1990] J.Q. no 289 (Que. C.A.). Other decisions had relied on s. 7 to 
invalidate formal bars to refugee determination or redetermination, which were similar in effect to 
ineligibility provisions in that they disentitled a non-citizen to claim refugee protection. Thus Kaur v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. No. 1100, [1990] 2 F.C. 209 
(F.C.A.) and Mattia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] F.C.J. No. 247, 
[1987] 3 F.C. 492 (F.C.T.D.) found that s. 7 mandated that an immigration inquiry be reopened so 
that a non-citizen could make a claim for refugee status if he or she had been prevented from doing 
so because of duress or mental illness. In Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
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ineligibility determinations by themselves and in general did not engage 
section 7 of the Charter.  
Most important in this regard was the 1991 Federal Court of Appeal 
case Berrahma, a case involving a refugee protection claimant ineligible to 
make a claim because he had been rejected less than 90 days earlier.79 
Rather than determining whether that ineligibility criterion or 
determination complied with fundamental justice, in Berrahma Marceau 
J.A. simply found that section 7 was not engaged. He reasoned that section 7 
did not impose a positive duty on the government “to provide protection to 
everyone whose life or liberty may be at risk, still less to provide a refuge 
for all inhabitants of the globe who may fear for their lives or security”; 
rather “for it to be applicable, there must be a specific act, legislation, not 
merely a failure to act.”80 In Singh, he continued, section 7 was engaged 
because “[Mr.] Singh was denied a status which the law gave him the right 
to claim without having any opportunity of showing that he met the 
conditions for obtaining it, whereas the ineligible claimant is not denied a 
status he is entitled to claim.”81  
We are here in the upper row of Table 1 ((a1, b1) and (a1, b2)), the 
most conservative readings of Singh. Note just how thoroughly this 
reading of Singh evades constitutionalism. If a statutory entitlement is 
necessary to engage section 7, then it is within Parliament’s power to 
evade obligations of fundamental justice toward refugees simply by 
omitting refugee protection and rights against removal from immigration 
legislation.  
Berrahma has been repeatedly affirmed for the proposition that neither 
ineligibility provisions nor determinations engage section 7 of the 
Charter.82 However, the courts have retreated from its strongest implications. 
                                                                                                                       
Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. No. 613, [1989] 3 F.C. 487 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal found 
that s. 7 required that the Immigration Appeal Board (I.A.B.) have the discretion to grant extensions 
of time to applicants seeking the redetermination of the Minister’s decision on their claim. 
79  Berrahma v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 180, 
132 N.R. 202 (F.C.A.). 
80  Id., at para. 11. 
81  Id., at para. 12. 
82  See Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 47, 
[1993] 1 F.C. 696, at para. 8 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1993] S.C.C.A. No. 103 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Nguyen”]; Hernandez v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1993] F.C.J. No. 950, at para. 13 
(F.C.T.D.); Gervasoni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 475, 
110 F.T.R. 297 (F.C.T.D.); Jekula v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 
F.C.J. No. 1503, [1999] 1 F.C. 266 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter “Jekula”]; Raza v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1826, [1999] 2 F.C. 185 (F.C.T.D.); Soe v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 913, 2007 FC 671 (F.C.); J.P., supra, 
note 39, at para. 123. At times the courts have nonetheless said that, in the circumstances of a case,  
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This may be on account of two important Supreme Court decisions that 
followed soon after. The first of these was Kindler,83 which found that 
extradition to face the death penalty engaged section 7 but did not violate 
the principles of fundamental justice. In a concurring opinion supporting 
this conclusion, La Forest J. invoked the common law principle of broad 
state discretion over immigration matters: “The Government has the right 
and duty to keep out and to expel aliens from this country if it considers it 
advisable to do so.”84 Next, in Chiarelli,85 the Supreme Court — citing 
Kindler but ignoring Singh — held that the deportation of a long-time 
permanent resident, who was not a refugee or a refugee claimant, on 
grounds of criminality did not violate the principles of fundamental justice. 
This result flowed from the observation, often repeated since, that the 
principles of fundamental justice in the immigration context had to be 
determined in light of the “most fundamental principle of immigration 
law”, namely “that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or 
remain in the country”.86  
Once Kindler and Chiarelli were decided, the courts increasingly gave 
them analytical prominence over Singh; this is the second development 
that led to Singh’s weakening. This prominence is important for a number 
of reasons. Most obvious, by endorsing the traditional common law 
principle regarding immigration matters, Kindler and Chiarelli suggested 
that whatever Singh stood for, it could not be that section 7 mandates the 
grant of permanent status to refugees. Kindler and Chiarelli further seemed 
to affirm that Singh could have no bearing on the deportation of non-citizen 
criminals, at least outside the refugee context.87 It is of great importance, 
then, that two Federal Court of Appeal decisions that followed soon after 
seemed to demand a reconciliation of Singh’s assertion of the Charter 
rights of refugees, on the one hand, and Kindler and Chiarelli’s reassertion 
of the traditional immigration law power on the other. 
                                                                                                                       
s. 7 may be engaged: see Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Agbasi, [1993] 
F.C.J. No. 113, [1993] 2 F.C. 620 (F.C.T.D.). 
83  Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kindler”]. Kindler was decided on September 26, 1991; Berrahma had been 
decided on February 21, 1991. 
84  Id., at para. 133 (per La Forest J.).  
85  Chiarelli, supra, note 61. 
86  Id., at para. 24.  
87  In Kindler, supra, note 83, at para. 133, La Forest J. also added: “I am aware that on 
humane grounds, provision is now made for the admission of political refugees, but that, of course, 
has no relevance here.” 
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Barrera88 was a judicial review by the Federal Court of Appeal of a 
decision to issue a deportation order on criminal grounds against a Chilean 
national who had been recognized as a refugee. Justice MacGuigan dealt 
with a section 7 argument summarily, without considering the fact that  
Mr. Barrera was a refugee, on the basis that deportation of criminal  
non-citizens did not engage the right to liberty; he did not consider security 
of the person or the potential relevance of Singh.89 Mr. Barrera’s refugee 
status was instead approached as potentially giving rise to a problem with 
respect to the guarantee against cruel and unusual treatment found in 
section 12 of the Charter. On this point, MacGuigan J.A. found Mr. Barrera’s 
Charter challenge premature because “it is only a return to Chile which 
could conceivably put the appellant in any s. 12 danger, and it is only the 
Minister who has the statutory power to subject him to that danger.”90 
In the context of section 12 jurisprudence, this finding makes some 
sense, as the Supreme Court had found in Kindler that section 12 requires 
a stronger link between the impugned government action and the potential 
harm than challenges under section 7.91 But the idea of prematurity was 
applied the next year by the Federal Court of Appeal in Nguyen in the 
context of section 7.92  
Nguyen involved a non-citizen who sought to claim refugee status at a 
hearing into his inadmissibility but was found ineligible to make a claim 
due to convictions for serious offences. Justice Marceau found that the 
constitutionality of the finding that Mr. Nguyen was removable on 
criminal grounds was “easy to verify” following Kindler and Chiarelli.93 
He then found section 7 was not engaged by the ineligibility decision. 
Contrary to the approach he had taken in Berrahma, he now relied on 
prematurity: “a declaration of ineligibility does not imply or lead, in 
itself, to any positive act which may affect life, liberty or security of the 
person.”94 This makes less sense than the use of prematurity under 
                                                                                                                       
88  Barrera v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. No. 1127, 
[1993] 2 F.C. 3 (F.C.A.). In this case, the Appeal Division relied on an unreported Trial Division 
case, Donoso v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), since reported at [1989] F.C.J. 
No. 645, 30 F.T.R. 241 (F.C.T.D.), for the principle of prematurity. 
89  Id., at para. 11. 
90  Id.  
91  Kindler, supra, note 83, at para. 169 (per McLachlin J.); United States v. Burns, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 8, 2001 SCC 7, at paras. 54-57 (S.C.C.), affg [1997] B.C.J. No. 1558 (B.C.C.A.). 
92  Nguyen, supra, note 82, at para. 8. 
93  Id., at para. 7 (F.C.) (“The constitutional validity of the [inadmissibility] decision … is easy 
to verify, especially following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kindler … and Chiarelli … .”). 
94  Id., at para. 8 (F.C.). Justice Marceau changed his gloss on Singh, saying that Wilson J.’s 
finding of s. 7 engagement in that case was based on the fact that the “right to claim refugee status” 
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section 12, given that Wilson J. in Singh had found that the right to 
security of the person was engaged by a mere “threat” and given that the 
potential for an eventual infringement engages section 7 throughout 
criminal and extradition proceedings.95  
Justice Marceau’s analysis in Nguyen included two further nuances. 
The first is that, although he found that neither the inadmissibility nor the 
ineligibility decisions in isolation engaged section 7, the two decisions in 
combination did; he went on to find, however, that there was no violation 
of substantive or procedural principles of fundamental justice.96 Then, at 
the end of his opinion, he added the following remark: 
It would be my opinion, however, that the Minister would act in direct 
violation of the Charter if he purported to execute a deportation order 
by forcing the individual concerned back to a country where, on the 
evidence, torture and possibly death will be inflicted. It would be, it 
seems to me, … at the very least, an outrage to public standards of 
decency, in violation of the principles of fundamental justice under 
section 7 of the Charter.97 
This passage is, at least, in tension with his reasoning in Berrahma, 
acknowledging as it does a principle of fundamental justice that is not 
statutorily contingent. Why the shift? Without wishing to make a strong 
explanatory claim here (since other extradition cases had already found 
that surrender decisions engaged section 7 prior to Berrahma98), it is 
                                                                                                                       
had been previously granted. So now s. 7 was engaged not by the right to refugee protection made 
available by statute, but by the fact that the right to claim such status had already been granted. 
95  See Stewart, supra, note 19, at 236 and 272. Given space constraints, I do not consider 
here whether this broader availability of s. 7 in the criminal and extradition contexts should be 
extended to the immigration context (see my comment, supra, note 7). The point is only that the 
concrete result is that outcomes in the immigration context are less justified than outcomes in the 
criminal and extradition contexts. 
96  Nguyen, supra, note 82. Justice Marceau attributed this style of reasoning to the Supreme 
Court in Chiarelli, supra, note 61. See also Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [1990] F.C.J. No. 157, [1990] 2 F.C. 299 (F.C.A.), revd [1992] S.C.J. No. 27 (S.C.C.); 
Grewal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 913, [1992] 1 F.C. 
581 (F.C.A.); Kaberuka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J.  
No. 1093, [1995] 3 F.C. 252 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter “Kaberuka”]. More recently, see the decision of 
Mactavish J. in Atawnah v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 
[2015] F.C.J. No. 782¸ 2015 FC 774, at para. 67 (F.C.), affd [2016] F.C.J. No. 481 (F.C.A.). 
97  Id. 
98  See Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 24, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42 (S.C.C.), 
affg [1984] O.J. No. 2647 (Ont. C.A.). Justice Marceau himself wrote the lead opinion for the 
Federal Court of Appeal panel whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kindler: 
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1988] F.C.J. No. 1153, [1989] 2 F.C. 492 (F.C.A.), affd 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 63 (S.C.C.). Justice Marceau’s opinion did not deal with s. 7, but the concurring 
opinion of Pratte J.A. appears to presuppose that s. 7 was engaged in that case. 
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nonetheless the case that Kindler confirmed that in the context of 
extradition, a surrender decision to potentially face the death penalty 
engages section 7,99 while Chiarelli declined to decide whether the 
removal of a long-term permanent resident engages section 7 by itself.100 
In the face of these reasons, it seems harder to maintain a claim that 
section 7 was entirely contingent on statutory rights. This last finding by 
Marceau J.A. is also consistent with the later holding in Suresh, which was 
cited by the Chief Justice in Febles, as it is with later pronouncements by 
the Federal Court of Appeal that “a risk assessment and determination 
conducted in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice is a 
condition precedent to a valid determination to remove an individual.”101 
Again without wishing to make a strong explanatory claim, I believe the 
courts were comfortable with making this move because they saw 
themselves as recognizing only a negative right against removal, while at 
the same time denying any Charter-protected affirmative right to some sort 
of permanent status.  
Barrera introduced the idea of prematurity, but in the context of an 
analysis under section 12 of the Charter. Justice Marceau’s analysis in 
Nguyen employed the same idea in the context of section 7, but with the 
important nuance that, although an ineligibility decision would not engage 
section 7, the overall statutory scheme would.102 The third and final 
development in the story is the subsequent reaffirmation that it is 
premature to raise section 7 prior to a decision pertaining to removal, while 
denying the need to examine the statutory scheme as a whole as was done 
in Nguyen. This principle is set out in Jekula, a 1998 case of the Federal 
Court-Trial Division.103 It has since been repeated many times over in 
cases involving many different kinds of proceedings before the IRB 
involving refugee protection claimants, including vacation decisions,104 
                                                                                                                       
99  Kindler, supra, note 83, at para. 171 (per McLachlin J.) and para, 127 (per La Forest J.) 
(S.C.C.). 
100  Chiarelli, supra, note 61, at para. 21. 
101  Farhadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 646, 27 
N.R. 158, at para. 3 (F.C.A.). 
102  Supra, note 96. 
103  Jekula, supra, note 82, at para. 33, affd [2000] F.C.J. No. 1956, 266 N.R. 355 (F.C.A.). 
As authority for this passage, Evans J. (as he then was) relied on Kaberuka, supra, note 96. 
However, Kaberuka had found that while ineligibility determinations by themselves did not engage 
s. 7, the joint operation of the ineligibility determinations in combination with the provision allowing 
for removal did engage s. 7, a finding Evans J. ignored.  
104  Coomaraswamy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 
603, 2002 FCA 153, at para. 24 (F.C.A.), affg [2001] F.C.J. No. 183 (F.C.T.D.). 
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cessation decisions,105 decisions regarding whether to grant refugee 
protection,106 decisions (like Febles) to exclude persons from refugee 
protection107 and inadmissibility decisions (like B010).108 
Thus the four possible readings of Singh were winnowed down to one 
— (a2, b1) in Table 1 — by the sub-Supreme Federal Courts. In those 
courts, Singh lost its constitutional vitality long ago, weakened by its 
own ambiguities and by the renewed avowal of a broad immigration 
power in Kindler and Chiarelli. Despite this fact, however, the possibility 
persisted that in the eyes of the Supreme Court, Singh still stood for 
fundamental justice before the IRB. In Dehghani, from 1993, Iacobucci J. 
wrote for a unanimous Court that in Singh, “Wilson J. held that since the 
refugee claim determination process has the potential to deprive a 
Convention refugee of security of the person, the determination process 
must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.”109 And in its last 
mention of this feature of Wilson J.’s opinion, in the 2007 Charkaoui 
decision, the Court cited Singh for the proposition that section 7 could be 
engaged by the process for determining the reasonableness of security 
certificates, which are jointly issued by the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety to certify a non-citizen as 
inadmissible on security or other grounds, because such certificates “may 
lead to removal from Canada, to a place where his or her life would be 
threatened”,110 Indeed, after referring to Charkaoui, the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Benitez undertook a section 7 analysis with respect to 
proceedings before the RPD without raising the issue of engagement.111 
On the strength of these pronouncements, it was still just possible to 
hold onto a robust reading of Singh. This was possible because of 
everything the courts below had never fully explained: why section 7 
                                                                                                                       
105  Romero v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] F.C.J. No. 720, 2014 FC 671, 
at paras. 120-124 (F.C.). 
106  Laidlow v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 150, 2012 FC 144, 
at paras. 62-63 (F.C.), affd [2012] F.C.J. No. 1270, 2012 FCA 256, at para. 15 (F.C.A.). 
107  Shephard v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] F.C.J. No. 494, 2008 FC 379, 
at para. 32 (F.C.). 
108  Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 381, 
2005 FCA 85, at para. 63 (F.C.A.), affg [2004] F.C.J. 384 (F.C.).  
109  Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38, 
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) (original emphasis), affg [1990] F.C.J. No. 558 (F.C.A.). 
110  Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 SCC 9, at 
para. 14 (S.C.C.), revg [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060 (F.C.A.) (emphasis added). 
111  Benitez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 735, 2007 FCA 199 
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 391 (S.C.C.). Another decision that assumed 
that s. 7 was engaged at the refugee claim stage is Cota v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1999] F.C.J. No. 872 (F.C.T.D.). 
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would not be engaged in refugee claims in a manner analogous to 
criminal and extradition proceedings; why a doctrine of prematurity that 
originated under section 12 of the Charter also applies under section 7; 
why the “fundamental principle of immigration law” enunciated in 
Chiarelli does not give way when refugee status is at stake. In Febles and 
B010, the Chief Justice aligned herself with the lower courts without 
providing answers to any of these questions. 
V. PORTRAIT OF A WEAK IMMIGRATION CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Once again, such an explanatory gap is disappointing from the point 
of view of the practice of constitutionalism. In this last section, I also 
want to highlight the ways in which the Chief Justice’s pronouncements 
allow for the restructuring of our system of refugee protection in a way 
that minimizes Canada’s justificatory obligations, rendering even more 
remote the ideal of constitutionalism in immigration governance. Before 
reviewing these structural implications, it is helpful to recap. In Febles 
and B010, the Chief Justice suggested that for refugee claimants, section 
7 of the Charter is engaged only prior to removal during a PRRA, and 
only insofar as the PRRA may lead to a stay of removal; not, that is, 
insofar as the PRRA may lead to refugee status. For the Chief Justice, it 
followed that section 7 is not engaged before the IRB, either in refugee 
protection proceedings or in inadmissibility proceedings that may 
preclude access to the RPD. Febles and B010 also suggest that 
fundamental justice at the PRRA stage requires a balancing of the risks 
that a foreign national or permanent resident would face against the 
danger the person would pose to the Canadian public.112 There is no 
mention in either decision of a requirement for an oral hearing to deal 
with credibility issues, as Singh suggested.113  
                                                                                                                       
112  Febles, supra, note 9, at para. 67. 
113  Supra, note 10. It is notable in this regard that in Suresh, cited by the Chief Justice in 
Febles, the Supreme Court found that no oral hearing was required during the process for 
determining whether or not to issue a danger opinion that would allow for removal of a person to a 
country where they would be at risk of torture: Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002 SCC 1, at para. 121 (S.C.C.), revg [2000] F.C.J. No. 5 
(F.C.A.). Gerald Heckman has pointed out to me that Mr. Suresh had had access to an oral hearing 
(lasting 50 days) in the determination of the reasonableness of the security certificate to which he 
was subject. Perhaps such an argument could be made, but the issues at stake with respect to the 
reasonableness of a security certificate and the balancing of risk are in substance different, as well as 
being presided over in the one case by a judge and in the other by a Minister.  
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A first anomalous implication of the resulting picture is that it runs up 
against the widely held view that Singh led to the creation of the IRB and 
what is today the RPD.114 With its system of mandatory oral hearings at 
the RPD115 and appeals (though not in all cases116) to the RAD, the IRB is 
the administrative decision-maker that provides the greatest procedural 
protections for risk determinations under the IRPA. The RPD and RAD are 
also the only decision-makers established under the IRPA with section 52 
constitutional competence with respect to the legislative provisions bearing 
on refugee protection.117 If section 7 is not engaged by refugee protection 
claims before the IRB, and if it can be satisfied by balancing as part of a 
largely paper review prior to removal, it is not clear whether the many 
cumbersome safeguards and rules that now saddle refugee protection 
determinations at the IRB could not be done away with. Indeed, the RPD 
and the RAD themselves seem to be constitutionally optional. 
A second anomalous implication arises because factual and legal 
findings made at the IRB by either the RPD or the RAD (in the case of 
refugee protection claims) or by the Immigration Division or Immigration 
Appeal Division (in the case of inadmissibility cases) have a significant 
downstream impact during PRRA applications. That impact is in part 
because a PRRA, unlike the RAD, is not an appeal. Factual findings made 
by the IRB’s divisions will be taken as a given, unless they can be 
displaced by admissible evidence of new risk developments.118 Since many 
of the factual findings by the RPD and/or RAD will touch on credibility, it 
is hard to see how one could meaningfully evaluate the conformity of a 
PRRA decision with fundamental justice without taking into account the 
justice of upstream IRB determinations. Here it should be recalled that in 
Bedford, the Supreme Court had found that to engage section 7, all that is 
                                                                                                                       
114  Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: The History of 
Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), at 414-15. A series of 
reports on the refugee status determination system in Canada prior to Singh had also been critical of 
the existing system; all three called for oral hearings for all claims: id., at 413.  
115  Except in cases where a claim is approved and the Minister has not given notice of an 
intention to intervene: IRPA, s. 170(b) and (f). 
116  IRPA, s. 110(2). 
117  That is, competence to find that legislation is of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Members of the 
RPD and RAD do not, obviously, have the power to strike legislation down.  
118  Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 1632, 2007 FCA 
385, at para. 12 (F.C.A.), affg [2006] F.C.J. No. 1779 (F.C.). This decision pre-dated the coming-into-force 
of the RAD, so in claiming that the PRRA is not an appeal of a RAD decision, I am extending a principle 
found in Raza with respect to RPD decisions. Evidence during a PRRA is admissible only if it “arose after 
the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected 
in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection”: IRPA, s. 113(a).  
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required is “a sufficient causal connection” between the government law or 
conduct and the infringement of the right to life, liberty, or security of the 
person.119 Given the impact of the RPD and RAD decisions on the later 
PRRA process, it is unclear why those prior decisions would not have a 
“sufficient causal connection” to the potential rights infringements faced 
by refugees or refugee protection claimants upon removal to a country 
where their life, liberty, or security of the person would be at risk.  
Moreover, the connection between the IRB and the PRRA is not merely 
causal. The two decision points are also linked by the fact that they apply 
the same substantive statutory provisions, sections 96 to 98 of the IRPA, in 
making protection decisions.120 Even if section 98 is free from ambiguity, 
as the Chief Justice held in Febles, this is not likely to be true of sections 96 
and 97. These provisions set out, respectively, the Convention refugee 
definition and certain grounds for general human rights protection. The 
RPD and the RAD are the source of most of the case law regarding these 
provisions. To find, as the Chief Justice did, that section 7 cannot be invoked 
in their interpretation before the RPD or the RAD walls off these provisions 
and this case law from meaningful Charter scrutiny, just as it walls off the 
most important fact-finding stage in what is really an interconnected 
decision-making scheme. 
The third and final structural implication of Febles and B010 stems 
from the fact that the PRRA is not actually the last possible decision made 
prior to removal. Among the former Conservative government’s reforms to 
the IRPA were provisions establishing that persons rejected by the RPD 
and/or RAD, or whose claims are withdrawn or abandoned, are not entitled 
to a PRRA before either 12 months or 36 months have passed (these are 
commonly referred to as the “PRRA bars”),121 with the latter being the 
case for nationals of purportedly safe “designated countries of origin”.122 
                                                                                                                       
119  Bedford, supra, note 19, at para. 75.  
120  IRPA, ss. 96-98. 
121  IRPA, s. 112(2)(c). 
122  Designated countries of origin (“DCOs”) are countries designated under s. 109.1 of 
IRPA. That provision provides for designation, either based on quantitative criteria (which criteria 
are established according by Ministerial orders that are not legislatively constrained) or qualitative 
assessments based on whether the country has an independent judiciary, protects “basic democratic 
rights and freedoms”, and “civil society organizations” exist. A provision (IRPA, s. 110(2)(d.1)) 
denying nationals of DCOs a right of appeal to the RAD was found unconstitutional by the Federal 
Court last year: Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] F.C.J. No. 880, 
2015 FC 892 (F.C.). The new Liberal government abandoned an appeal of that decision (see The 
Canadian Press, “Liberals drop legal appeal of unconstitutional Conservative refugee measure” 
(January 4, 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-drop-legal-appeal-of-unconstitutional- 
conservative-refugee-measure-1.3389336>. They have also pledged to use a committee of human 
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No PRRA will take place if they are removed within these timelines. If it is 
the case that section 7 is not engaged before the IRB, then persons 
removed prior to receiving a PRRA may never get access to a process in 
which their rights must be determined in accordance with fundamental 
justice. If the various protections included with refugee protection 
determination at the RPD or RAD were removed, as in principle they can 
be, this concern would no longer be purely academic. Two Charter 
challenges to the PRRA bars have gone to the Federal Court of Appeal.123 
These have failed because persons who do not have access to a PRRA may 
nonetheless either ask an enforcement officer to defer removal or seek a 
judicial stay of removal: so just as the Chief Justice turned aside Charter 
arguments with respect to determinations at the IRB by pointing to the 
PRRA, the Federal Court of Appeal has now turned aside Charter 
arguments with respect to the bars on access to a PRRA by pointing to 
these later decision points. Faced with a request for a deferral, an 
enforcement officer must consider whether the individual has provided 
sufficient new evidence (that is, evidence not previously assessed) that 
they would be exposed to “a risk of death, extreme sanction or inhumane 
treatment”.124 If appealed to the Supreme Court and upheld, this line of 
reasoning suggests even PRRAs need not be made available for everyone 
under the Charter. 
In sum, after B010 and Febles, greater procedural protections, as well 
as Charter competence, now reside in a Board before which section 7 
challenges to immigration proceedings and legislation are premature and 
which itself may be constitutionally optional. All that may be required by 
section 7 of the Charter is a system under which a CBSA enforcement 
officer screens written requests for deferrals of removal for cases where 
there may be sufficient evidence to establish a risk of death, extreme 
sanction or inhumane treatment. In those cases, the person may be required 
to receive a PRRA. The result seems to be a profound mismatch of 
legislative design and the courts’ Charter jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                       
rights experts for designation of countries. However, they have not disavowed other aspects of the 
DCO regime, including the 36-month PRRA bar. 
123  Savunthararasa v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 
[2016] F.C.J. No. 173, 2016 FCA 51 (F.C.A.), affg [2014] F.C.J. No. 1133 (F.C.) and Atawnah v. 
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2016] F.C.J. No. 481, 2016 FCA 
144 (F.C.A.), affg [2015] F.C.J. No. 782 (F.C.).  
124  Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Shpati, [2011] F.C.J. 
No. 1454, 2011 FCA 286, at paras. 43-44 (F.C.A.), revg [2010] F.C.J. No. 1275 (F.C.); see also 
Baron v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2009] F.C.J. No. 314, 
2009 FCA 81 (F.C.A.), affg [2008] F.C.J. No. 434 (F.C.). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In Appulonappa and B010, the government sought to defend a broad 
warrant to prosecute or find inadmissible those who help persons enter 
Canada contrary to the IRPA, even when the beneficiaries are asylum 
seekers and the help is provided for humanitarian or other non-pecuniary 
motives; indeed, even when the targets of enforcement are themselves 
asylum seekers. The Court declined to give them that warrant. This was 
obviously a good result for those concerned about migrants’ rights, and 
more specifically with the use of anti-smuggling initiatives to claw back 
access to refugee protection. 
Nonetheless, I have argued that the Chief Justice’s two unanimous 
opinions are disappointing if one favours a robust immigration 
constitutionalism. First, the Chief Justice’s analysis of the section 7 Charter 
claim in Appulonappa rested on a methodology that takes for granted the 
constitutional soundness of Parliament’s policy goals and inquires only 
into the rationality of the means used to secure those goals. Such an 
analysis cannot be expected to yield principles of lasting power.  
The results are always liable to be disrupted by legislative change, such  
as the amendments to the offence of organizing illegal entry found in 
section 117 of the IRPA. Second, the Chief Justice in B010 confirmed an 
approach to section 7 of the Charter, which had been hinted at the year 
before in Febles and foreshadowed by years of sub-Supreme Federal Court 
case law, that will make constitutional justification harder to access and the 
protection of refugees more precarious. Third, the Chief Justice did not 
acknowledge that this position might depart from that espoused by Wilson J. 
in Singh, nor examine the impact her decision would have on the 
application of the Charter to refugee determination, nor take up basic 
questions, such as why section 7 is engaged in the realm of immigration 
and refugee law in a manner so at odds with criminal and extradition law. 
The result is an immigration constitutionalism that is inadequately 
explained and more likely to allow for unjustified decisions. 
 
